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The final argument in the Hinton Competition begins.

recurring problem of policy is the reconciliation
of the interests of individuals and those of
groups
which are favored by the law because
meet, or
at

least

they
thought to meet, important social needs.
problem which underlies the controversy

are

It is this

about the two topics which I have been asked

dis

to

( 1) recognition and organizational picketing,
and (2) the so-called
"right-to-work" laws. Accord
before
to
these topics, I want briefly
ingly,
turning
cuss

-

remind you of the general framework for reconcil
ing group and individual interests which has heen
to

embodied in

our

national labor

policy.

The

Wagner Act, closely following the analogy of
political elections, embodied the principle of free
choice

by the individual employee and the principle
majority rule. It also provided for the establish
ment of election
machinery for determining the em
uncoerced
ployees'
preferences with respect to repre
sentation. The Taft-Hartley Act, without
disturbing
those provisions, made it plain that the
principle of
free choice meant that the right to
reject a bargaining
of

representative
Finalists in the Hinton Competition, left to right, the team of:
Clarence J. Amstutz, [r., of Ohio, A.B., Oberlin College; Rob
ert T. Cornwell of Oklahoma, AB., Central State College;
and Robert L. Reinke of Indiana, A.B., Wabash College.

the

was

select

entitled

to

the

same

respect

as

The

right
Taft-Hartley Act, like
the Wagner Act, entitles a union to
bargaining rights
only if it has the uncoerced support of a majority of
the employees in the unit. In a. Board-conducted elec
tion, a majority of those voting is in general entitled
to
speak for the entire unit.
The bargaining agent, under the
majority rule prin
ciple, has broad and exclusive authority in negotiating
to

one.

the terms and conditions of

employment.

ployer

representative

no

must

one

else.

bargain

with the

The

em

and with
The interests of the individual and of

smaller groups within a bargaining unit are thus sub
ordinated to, and may be sacrificed to, the interests
of the entire group, subject only to the

representa

tive's

duty

of fair

representation

of all

Continued

employees,
on
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private groups should depend on the con
majority of those governed.
There are those who would repudiate the require
ment of
majority support on the ground that a union,

political
by

sent

at

or

a

least if it represents

industry,

is

automatically

a

substantial

giance and support.

I find this

for several

First it

reasons:

segment of

an

entitled to the worker's alle

argument unacceptable

ignores

value of collective

the fact that the

both to the

bargaining
enterprise
employees depends on consent, by the
employees affected, to the bargaining agent's role
and to the agreement he has negotiated. Majority
support, although it is not sufficient, is generally nec
and to the

essary, for such consent. For the purpose of deter
mining the existence of such support, the "industry"
an abstraction far removed from the
employee's
interest, which is generally centered in the plant or

is

the

enterprise which employs him. Accordingly, the
plant or the enterprise and not the industry appears

general to be the largest unit which can be appro
priately used in determining whether the necessary
majority support exists. Secondly, the use of the
smallest possible unit, consistent with orderly and
stable collective bargaining, will minimize the need
for subordinating the preferences of large and con
in

centrated minorities to the
R. H.

Maudsley

Professor in 1959.

Maudsley,

after first class honors at

Birming

and six years of war service received
the B.C.L. with first class honors at Oxford University.

ham
He

University,

was

then

lege, and/ has

appointed
held that

a

Fellow of Brasenose Col

position continually

to date.

He will be at the Law School from

until the end of the Summer

February, 1959,
Quarter of that year.

MeltzerContinued

from
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union and non-union, in the unit.

dentally,

(This duty,

is not easy to enforce in the

blatant forms of discrimination such
race.

as

inci

absence of

that based

on

)

Although

the statutory scheme involves

a

limitation

dissenting minority, this limita
tion seems justifiable on two grounds: First, it is nec
essary for orderly collective bargaining, which has
important values. Secondly, the requirement that the
bargaining agent have the support of the uncoerced
majority makes his authority consistent with the gen
erally accepted principle that the government of
on

the freedom of

a

of institutional arrangements which pro
the subordination of the interests of individuals
and minorities to those of larger groups .. For these

mote

pleased to announce the appointment
Maudsley, of Brasenose College, Oxford,

Visiting

a

Mr.

majority

expansion

The School is

as

of

Minimizing the coercion of such minorities is
still an important value in our society,
despite the

Visiting Professor
of Mr. R. H.

requirements

rule.

reasons, I believe that the architects of

policy

were

wise in

rejecting

the federal
the notion that unions,

like the state, are entitled to any automatic
allegiance.
When we move from the statute to the real world,
we

are

union
ent

confronted with familiar and controversial

organizing techniques

with the basic

which appear inconsist
of both the Wagner Act

philosophy
Taft-Hartley Act. I refer, of course, to recog
nition picketing and to its close relative, if not its
transparently disguised twin, organizational picketing.
An appraisal of such picketing requires a judgment
about the underlying purpose or. purposes involved.
This judgment is, in turn, complicated because such
and the

may vary with the individual situation.
Nevertheless, the following generalized and familiar

purposes

description seems reasonably valid:
Picketing is an attempt to isolate the employer from
his suppliers, his customers, and his employees. Al
though it involves communication, its primary signifi
cance is not as
argument appealing to reason but as
an instrument of economic
pressure. The severity of
that pressure will vary from case to case. It will de
pend on the allies of the picketing union, the sympa
thies of the employer's employees, the sentiments and

fears of his customers; the location of his

premises,
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are
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transparently disguised twin, organizational picketing.
An appraisal of such picketing requires a judgment
about the underlying purpose or. purposes involved.
This judgment is, in turn, complicated because such
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Nevertheless, the following generalized and familiar
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description seems reasonably valid:
Picketing is an attempt to isolate the employer from
his suppliers, his customers, and his employees. Al
though it involves communication, its primary signifi
cance is not as
argument appealing to reason but as
an instrument of economic
pressure. The severity of
that pressure will vary from case to case. It will de
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fears of his customers; the location of his

premises,

Vol. 7, No.2

The Law School Record

46

and

host of other factors. But

a

one

aspect of picket

constant; it is

the

designed
the employer and,
on
his
employees.
directly or indirectly,
Where a union which lacks majority support pickets
for immediate recognition, and the Taft-Hartley Act
or similar state
legislation is applicable, it is almost
certain that the picketing is designed (1) to cause
the employer to violate the statute by recognizing the
union despite its lack of majority support; (2) to
force the employer to coerce the neutral or anti-union
employees to join the union, again in violation of the
statute; and (3) to force the employees to join to
avoid the obvious danger to their jobs or earnings
resulting from the losses suffered by the enterprise.
The picketing may, as we will see later, also have
other objectives, but such objectives supplement,
rather than supersede, those just described.
When the union placard reads "join us" and the
union urges that it is only organizing and that it
doesn't want recognition until its has "persuaded" a
majority of the employees, is the situation any differ
ent? Since organizational picketing inflicts the same
kind of economic damage as recognition picketing,
the pressure on the employer to disregard, or to coerce
his employees' preferences, is the same, and the pres
sure on his
employees to surrender their preferences
for their jobs, is also the same. There may, of course,
be skepticism about the union's disclaimer of any
ing

relatively

is

maximum economic pressure

interest in immediate

to exert

on

recognition

in view of the trou

ble, the expense, and the commitment of union pres
tige which is involved in maintaining a picket line.
at face
Even if the union's disclaimer is

accepted

value,

two

disturbing

considerations remain:

First,

the coercive aspects of such picketing necessarily in
volve a threat to the employees' free choice; secondly,
alternative and non-coercive organizational devices

protected by the federal statute although
naturally controversy as to both the content

exist and

there is

are

and the administration of the statute. Under the fore
going circumstances, does the union's future interest
the threat to free choice and the
in

recognition justify

economic loss

ently

There
such

which

organizational picketing

pres

entails?
are

four

principal arguments

in

support of

which I do not find per

picketing, arguments
singly or in combination,

suasive, either

the

where union

protection of the

Taft-Hartley
organization enjoys
or similar
protection under state statutes.
( 1) The first argument, that peaceful organizational
picketing has the constitutional protection of free
Act

speech, has been outmoded by a sensible shift in doc
trine by the Supreme Court. The V ogt case, decided
last term, held that where there is a reasonable basis
for concluding that picketing was designed to coerce

the

employer
employees, a

with free choice by the
injunction against such picketing

interfering

into
state

protection of free speech

is consistent with the

em

bodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. The V ogt case
thus appears to dispose of the question undecided in

namely, whether, for free speech
purposes, organizational picketing should receive
more
protection than recognition picketing.
the Gazzani case,

The second

(2)

is that non-union

argument

em

if

ployees, they get less than unionized employees, are
undermining union standards, and if they get as much
or

from union activities but

more, benefit

I find that both

are

aspects of this argument

free riders.

unpersuasive.

employees get less, they ought to be ripe for
non-coercive organization. If they get as much or
more, it does not follow that they are free-riders.
If the

The forces which govern wage determination are too
complex to warrant that easy assumption. In many
situations, a forceful argument can be made that
has not raised wages in the organized,
the unorganized area. But whatever the

organization

let alone,
truth here, the acceptance of so expansive a free-rider
concept would flatly repudiate the desirable principle
that uncoerced
unit is

a

majority support in an appropriate
recognition.
argument has been recently advanced by

condition of

The third
Professor Cox of the Harvard Law School. In essence
it is that the primary significance of picketing is not
as economic coercion but as a demonstration of union
power which offsets the unorganized employees fear

of

running

ingly,

may be

a more

his

employer's

concludes,

reliable

poll

a

than

wishes. Accord

vote
a

after

vote

picketing

without

com

pressures. Professor Cox suggests, however,
union which has lost a Board-conducted elec

peting
that

counter to

Professor Cox

a

tion should not be

privileged

tional picketing.
I find this reasoning
culties.

subject

to continue

organiza

principal diffi
being squeezed

to three

who is

First,
employer,
by picketing, may not defer recognition until an elec
tion. His early surrender may, for practical purposes,
foreclose any test by the ballot rather than make such
test more reliable.
Secondly, the pressure on em
which
organizational (or recognition) picket
ployees
ing necessarily involves cannot, in the nature of
things, be nicely adjusted so as just to offset the em
ployees' fear of their employer. Picketing pressure
may in fact be so strong as to destroy employee free
choice. In any event, pressure on employees as a
an

of

means

lous

protecting their free choice seems anoma
It's like saying that a fellow applying for

to me.

your bodyguard is privileged to show his
by cracking you on the jaw.
Secondly, the picture of the cowed and fearful
employee may be overdrawn for many industries and
a

job

as

muscle

for many

regions

in the United

States,

now

that the

The
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statutory protections, including

employee,

it is not easy to

should end with

reliable

It could be

that

a

poll

continuous

until

next

require

argued
picketing

fears of their

offset

tion,
employees'
which presumably have been increased
weakness reflected in a losing election.
to

The third and most

see

election which

an

the union loses.

may

are

accept the full implications of

of the fearful

image
why the picketing

elections,

secret

are,' presumably, increasingly

20 years old and
familiar. Indeed, if we
over

the

University of Chicago

elec

employer,

by

the union

important difficulty

with Pro

unspoken appraisal
position
of competing interests involved. First,
there is the interest in organization on the part of
those employees who remain fearful despite compre
hensive statutory protections, including a secret bal
of the four

sets

Secondly, there
sector in expanding
lot.

however,

is the interest of the unionized

influence,

its

is not entitled to much

which,

interest

an

picketing is more persuasive. Coercive self-help to
rectify the inherent limitations of the law is a doubtful
and dangerous expedient. The acceptance of such
limitations, until the law is changed, is plainly one of
the conditions of an orderly society.
The acceptance of such imperfections is, I believe,
also necessary for orderly and stable collective bar
gaining. The adjustments required when a plant is
first organized are especially difficult for all concerned.
The difficulties

involves his

fessor Cox's

under

weight

a

stat

stressing uncoerced majority support in an appro
priate unit. Thirdly, there is the opposing interest
of those

employees

who

are

not

lawful

ing

us

employer.
why, that

afraid

to exercise their

is the interest of the

Professor Cox assumes, without tell
the interest of the fearful employees

organization should prevail over
competing interests. I find this value

and of the union in

the two other

judgment highly

dubious.

The final argument for organizational-recognition
is related to the argument advanced by Pro

picketing

fessor Cox.

It

emphasizes

that many

employers

do

obey the law, and that, they are often able to
nullify employee free choice by unfair labor practices
which cannot be proved or which even if proved and
ultimately remedied by the Board nevertheless suc
ceed in frustrating legitimate organizational attempts.
not

are

increased when the union lacks
it often will if

an
employer grants
majority support
he
wants to be rid of pick
because
recognition merely
eting, "organizational" or recognition. In opposing

as

the closed

shop,

Samuel

Compel's

and Louis Brandeis

among other friends of the union movement, warned
that a healthy labor movement and stable relation

ships within
compulsion.

a

plant

These

could be

warnings

union

jeopardized by

are, I

believe, relevant

here.

The

ute

statutory rights. Finally, there
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Lau: School

point

recent

to

disclosures

additional

by
dangers.

the McClellan Committee
Coercive

actual

picketing,

threatened, has been the weapon of the shake-down
artist, who will forego organization for the right price.

or

Such tactics, unfortunately but
the good name and the legally

inevitably, endanger
recognized privileges
of decent as well as corrupt union leadership. Organ
ization from the top by the employer also invites the
sweetheart contract by which unscrupulous employers
and so-called union leaders sell the men out under
soft contracts which, however, often include the union

shop and check-off provisions.
Although Section 302 of the Taft-Hartley Act makes
it illegal for employers to make, and union officials
to receive, certain payments, that Section is probably
not applicable to pay-offs designed to forestall organ
ization.

The sweetheart

contract

made with

a

union

most unorgan
that
stay
way. Furthermore,
employers
the inherent limitations of the law, as well as bad ad

lacking majority support may be nullified by the
Board. But in the absence of a rival union, recourse
to the law is discouraged by the union-employer solid

ministration, permit some employers, by unlawful
coercion, to deny to unions the bargaining status
which they would have otherwise achieved. But these

front. In any event, these perversions of picketing and
collective bargaining will be facilitated so long as em
ployers are subject to the threat of organizational or

It

is, I believe, fair

ized

to

assume that

want to

considerations, troublesome

as

they

the indiscriminate use of
against lawful as well as lawless

rant

are,

do

not

war

coercive

picketing

employers

and their

employees. The law attempts to surround non-coer
cive organizational efforts with comprehensive pro
tection.

Although

the law in this area,

as

in other

necessarily imperfect, such imper
fections do not justify coercive self-help. We would
give short shrift to an employer who sought to justify
reprisals against innocent employees on the ground
that some employees acting for a union had used tac

important

areas, is

were coercive but which could not be
be
so. It is not clear to me why an essen
proved
similar
tially
argument invoked to support coercive

tics which
to

recognition picketing
its

and the law and unions sanction

use.

What 1 have said
is

far suggests that recognition
incompatible with the basic and desirable
so

picketing
principle of free choice embodied in our national labor
policy and should not be lawful. It suggests also that
organizational picketing, although somewhat more
defensible, involves substantially similar difficulties.
Furthermore, any difference between the
of

picketing

is

essentially

two forms

verbal and is too tenuous

basis for different legal treatment. Accordingly, my
suggestion is that both forms of picketing by a union
a

which lacks

majority support

and which
Continued

enjoys
on

the

page 50
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from

the

protections granted by

Act

Taft-Hartley

should be unlawful.
submitted

analysis which I have
part, by the NLRB in

in

Brothers decision.
earlier

by

In that

precedents, held
immediately

union

a

the

the Board,

case

was ac

Curtis

recent

rejecting

"recognition picketing"

that

after it had lost

violation of the

election

an

I lack the

Act.

Taft-Hartley
time for an extended analysis of the decision but you
may be interested in the following high points: (1)
Four members of the five man Board looked beyond
the union placards to determine whether the picketing
involved was to be treated as recognition picketing.
a

was

Three members of the Board indicated that the
decision would be extended to minority picketing for

(2)

recognition and, indeed, to any other technique, such
as unfair lists or the instigation of consumer's boy
cotts,

interferes

which

the

with

free

employees'

choice, regardless of whether an election had taken
place. These three, however, reserved judgment on

organizational picketing. (3)
(J enkins) declared that the

A

concurring

decision

member
confined

was

the situation where recognition picketing continued
after the union had lost an election. ( 4) Member
Murdock, dissenting, urged that neither recognition
to

nor

organizational picketing

before

after

or

tion should be declared unlawful but went

that

recognition

and

an

to

say

are

in

on

organizational picketing

elec

distinguishable.
Before the Curtis decision, Secretary Mitchell had
indicated that he would recommend federal legisla

prohibiting recognition picketing but not organ
izational picketing. If the Board pushes the Curtis
reasoning to its logical conclusion and proscribes or
ganizational picketing the Secretary may be some
tion

may be forced either to
distinction or to press
verbal
essentially
for legislation which would enlarge, rather than nar

what

embarrassed.

He

abandon his

legally permissible picketing.
On the state level, the problem is dominated for
the present by the interplay of the Supreme Court's

row,

pre-emption

doctrine and the NLRB's

refusal, for

budgetary and other reasons, fully to exercise its stat
utory jurisdiction. Under the Court's doctrine, the
by virtue of the Taft-Hartley Act, may not
enjoin peaceful picketing or other non-violent union
techniques directed at an enterprise which is subject
to the Board's statutory jurisdiction, i. e. an enterprise.
states,

which «affects" interstate
will not take jurisdiction
exercise its

will in

general
enterprise meets

measures

of

a

the states from

precludes
ing.

The

result is

net

commerce.
over

But the Board

all such

enterprises;

jurisdiction only

certain tests of

size, which

substantial effect

on

it

where the
are

interstate

rough
com-

restraining peaceful picket
which makes

one

a

lawyer

somewhat uncomfortable. Peace

laymen
speaking
ful picketirig, which
to

The basic

cepted,

Nevertheless, the existence of statutory juris
by the Board, even though it is not exercised,

merce.

falls within the Board's theo

jurisdiction can not be directly
though state and federal law each
separately recognizes that injunctive relief would be
retical but unexercised

restrained

even

appropriate.

expand

requires action, which
(1) The Board could

this no-man's land

Plainly,
could take

of two forms:

one

the

area

in which it

exercised its

actually

Chairman Leedom has indi

statutory jurisdiction.

cated that the Board will take such action, the result
ing increase in the General Counsel's and the Board's

presumably require increased ap
propriations by Congress. (2) Congress by legisla
tion could modify the preemption doctrine so as to
revive state authority, at least in the area where the
work-load would

national Board refuses to act.
such

Pending

modification of the

a

doctrine state law

can

furnish

peaceful picketing only

injunctive

to an

ill-defined and

category of businesses, those which do
interstate

preemption
against

relief
not

narrow

"affect"

commerce.

I do not

mean

state action is

to

an

imply

that the

argument against

narrow

state

scope fer

legislation.

the contrary; the small enterprises which
found
be
may
by the courts not to "affect commerce,"
and their employees are particularly vulnerable to

Quite

to

picketing pressures and
legislative protection.

particularly

are

in need

of

hand, smaller employers probably find
get away with discriminatory reprisals
against employees for union activity. The principal
On the other

it easier to

and in my view, the decisive deficiency,
of H. B. 702, which was defeated in the last session
of the Illinois Assembly, was its failure to provide
for protection against such discrimination. H. B. 702

deficiency,

prohibited minority picketing whether for recognition
or
organization. It provided for elections, although it
failed to lay down criteria to govern unit determina
tion.

It failed also to indicate whether such determi

nations

were

to

be

reviewable. But its fun

judicially

damental

defect

ing which

the Bill would have outlawed.

its

failure

to provide any
of
protection against discharges
pro-union employees
or
against other employer conduct which is at least
as destructive of
employee free choice as the picket
was

Such pro
of
necessary. part
any anti
I
this
that
would
picketing legislation.
recognize
mean that Illinois would have to face all of the
tough
tection

seems

problems

to

me

to be

involved in

a

writing

a

comprehensive

labor

and the expense of administering such legislation.
I believe, however, that such legislation, which could
act
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of Chicago
J

draw

on

experience of other states, such

the

as

Wis-

and New York, would be desirable. During
period, I will be glad to explore meth

cons in

the discussion

ods for

achieving

the maximum

between labor and management
such an act.

possible agreement
on

the content of

controversy about arrangements compelling em
ployees to belong to or to give Rnancial support to
and about the so-called right-to-work laws
which would forbid such arrangements. I say "so
called" because such laws plainly do not give anyone
unions

right to work and because their exponents are gen
erally silent about restrictions on occupational choice
a

unless such restrictions flow from arrangements fa
vored by unions.
The controversy is so often confused by imprecise
rhetoric that it may be worth while to differentiate
the three principal arrangements involved.' First,

there is the closed

shop,

under which the

employer

may hire and retain in his employ only employees
who are, and remain, members of the union involved.

Secondly,

there is the traditional union

shop,

which

permits the hiring of non-union employees, but which
requires them to join the union within a specified
period and which also makes continued employment

membership. Finally there
union
"Taft-Hartley"
shop. Under that statute,

dependent
is the

amended,

as

retention of

on

a

union which has

majority support

the unit and which has satisfied certain

requirements
all

employees

in

procedural

may enter into an agreement requiring
involved to pay periodic dues and uni

form initiation fees within

thirty days

after their

em

ployment. The statute, however, confers on the states
the authority to prohibit even this limited arrange
ment.

The closed

shop plainly

confers great powers

on

imposes corresponding limitations on
the freedom of both the employer and his employees,
present and prospective. The dependence of em
ployment on union membership prevents manage
ment, despite its responsibilities, from hiring those
whom it considers most qualified, only union mem
bees-are eligible. This dependence also restricts the
occupational choices of members of the labor force
who are denied membership in the union involved
or who are
unwilling to accept such membership. The
the union and

closed shop thus empowers the union to determine
how many and who shall work in the enterprises in
volved, which may comprise substantially all of the

competitors

in

industry or an area. Even the state
seeking such powers in time of
special areas such as the public utility

an

has refrained from

peace, except in
ReId.
The substantial powers conferred by the closed shop
can be, and have been, used for purposes which are

society. For
been, used for private

our

and has

schemes

extortion

those in control of admissions to the union
stiff entrance fees on those who want to enter

whereby
impose
a

In the time which remains, I want to tum to the

generally accepted values of
example, the closed shop can be,

with the

incompatible

trade. It

can

be, and has been, used to implement
on race, creed, or sex, as well as

discrimination based

jobs hereditary. It
can be, and has been, used to create or to
intensify
labor shortages, thereby facilitating the exploitation
arrangements for

of

making

certain

and of other workers, who are forced
occupations. These consequences,

consumers

into less attractive

it is true, presuppose that the closed

shop is coupled
partially closed union, and this
combination has been subjected to judicial limitations
in some jurisdictions which generally sanction the
closed shop. Such limitations raise the question of
whether the evils of the closed shop could be reme
died by regulation without curtailing the benefits
which it allegedly creates-a question which I will
with the

mention

wholly

later

again

Although

them. The closed
as

a

industry

an

monopoly dangers
danger of ex
is
probably more
shop

I want to note the

shop,

reflection, than
where

power. Generally,
to obtain a closed
of

on.

I have referred to the

of the closed

aggerating
signiRcant

or

shop

over

or

a

a

as

a

a

over

of union

cause,

union is

strong enough
segment

substantial

Significant

number of

com

local market, it is also strong enough to
petitors
inflate the wage scale without recourse to the closed
in

a

shop. "Unduly high wages" indirectly result

in the

of entry into occupations which can be
achieved directly by the closed shop. Nevertheless,

restriction

the direct control

ferred

by

tion of

over

the closed

entry and

permitted by
occupation.

Even
can

though

high

a

such

result, such

a

rates

on

the union to engage in

con

behalf of
a

particu

permission has been granted,

be withdrawn since under

employees expelled
As

shop

entrants

facilitates both the restric

exaction of

those
lar

the number of

a

closed

shop

from the union forfeit their
contract vests

it

contract

jobs.

the union with far

reaching control over its members' activities on and off
the job. This power may be, and has been, used to
discipline not only wildcat-strikers and strike-breakers,
but also members who are critical of union policies
or of
corruption by union officials or who refrain from
paying assessments to support union legislative pro
posals which they personally oppose.
The foregOing criticisms of the closed shop have
been met by a defense which rests on the following
principal grounds:
( 1) The closed shop gives the union needed and
desirable security against anti-union attacks
by em
factionalism
within
the
union's
ployers, disruptive
own ranks, and raids
rival
unions.
As
a
result, the
by
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union

can

be

"responsible"

more

both in its demands

(2)

permits

the union to

see

to it

that

employees

have the skills necessary for the jobs involved.
( 3) It makes possible an adjustment of the supply
of workers to the "need for them."

( 4)

Most unions have used their powers

sibly";

"respon

employers have, indeed, found those

some

useful

powers

promoting plant discipline

in

and

I find these

enjoy

Hartley
Despite

Act

arguments unpersuasive

the
or

as

protection conferred by
similar protection under
of such

the inherent

to

unions

the Taft
state

law.

legal

pro

imperfections
they present a substantial obstacle to union
busting techniques on the part of employers and
tections,

represent,
free

in the

main,

a

reasonable balance between

choice and

for the

bargaining
changes in the
details of such protective regulation are required, they
should be effected within the general regulatory frame
work and scarcely justify the closed shop.
N or is the closed shop necessary to Insure either
proper skill or discipline on the part of employees.
As to discipline, the employer, if he is not unduly
restricted by the union, has in most cases the incentive
as well as the
authority to take appropriate action,
And even if an occasional employer should wish help
employee

representative.

stability

To the extent that

from the union, his desires should not be more con
trolling than the union's, in view of the other interests

employer's self-interest can
generally
employees of requisite
skill. Where, however, the public interest requires
additional control, the appropriate remedy would ap
pear to be regulation by politically responsible"
authority rather than by private groups. This point is
equally applicable to regulation of the supply of
particular workers.
Finally, neither experience nor analysis supports the
view that "union responsibility" can be relied on to
avoid abuse of the broad authority granted by the
closed shop. This authority is too closely related to the
involved.

Similarly,

be relied

the

on

to insure

union's power interests and its drive for maximizing
the gains of its members to be kept in check by an
amorphous concept of responsibility which, except in
small and ill-defined category of cases, is not backed
up by legal sanctions. We have not, in general, relied
a

on

"employer responsibility"

science"

tion

I lack the time to argue the
�

that arrangement.

ject

to

to

the

"corporate

a

This

qualification,

choice.

employees

in

develop

a

a

does not

shop

require

union

condition of hire, but does require
the union within a specified period

are

and if it is

high,
expulsion

likely

costs

for

new

that unions will

power after entry, employers
will be reluctant to hire new employees without union
clearance. Under such circumstances, the union
shop by another name.

shop

would be the closed
It

seems

unlikely, however,

that this theoretical dan

ger has been a real one. In the mass production indus
tries, the traditional union shop has apparently not
been used

to

achieve indirect control

over

the

hiring

process. And in other industries, there has been little
occasion to resort to such indirection since generally,

although not always, both the closed shop and the
traditional union shop have been legal or illegal.
Even if the danger of indirect control over hiring
is dismissed as
imaginary, the traditional union shop
suffers from the objection that it gives the union far

reaching power over the lives of the employees after
they have been employed. This is true because their
continued employment is dependent upon their con
tinued membership in the union. Some unions have
established internal procedures designed to prevent
abuses of this power, and the courts have sought to
subject it to a concept of due process. But the pos
sibilities for substantial abuses which remain suggest
that the traditional union shop, like the closed shop,
should remain

illegal-provided that the protections
Taft-Hartley Act, or similar protections, are in

of the
effect.
This
such

proviso is an important one. In the absence of
protection of organizational interests, the em

choice

is

privileged to
by tactics that

important interests. There is no reason for being more
sanguine about the effectiveness of "union respon

history.

sibility."

union

problem have been equally
self-regulation in an area which

sub

which I will

Nevertheless, if the break-in

exercise their

curb business conduct which threatens

Other students of the

suggestion is, however,

membership
employees to join
after they are employed, and to retain their member
ship thereafter. This arrangement theoretically does
not limit the employer's
right to select his employees
and imposes a much gentler restriction on occupational
as

ployer

distrustful of union

I believe that such

moment.

con

or

point,

regulation would adequately protect the interests
involved only if it in substance denied the powers
flowing from the closed shop. It seems to me more
efficient to deny such powers directly by proscribing

This traditional union

stability.
which

individual

disciplining

It

exploitation of the public and tyranny over
employers. But they have urged that regula�
rather than prohibition, is the answer. Although

invites

workers who engage in activities,
such as wildcat strikes, which are inconsistent with
plant discipline and orderly collective bargaining.
and in
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frustrate the

employees'

free

sorry chapter of our
Under such circumstances, the argument that

the arrangements

we

are

a

have examined

are

necessary for

appealing despite the fact that such
arrangements may be used to exploit the public and to
tyrannize the employees.
security

are
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position con
cerning the closed and traditional union shop. It enter
prises in particular industries or in any given labor
market were evenly divided between open shops and
closed shops, I doubt that there would be any case for
There is another

either the closed

prohibiting

of my

qualification

union

or

Under

shop.

such circumstances, the monopoly problem associated
with the closed shop would be obviated by cornpeti
tive pressures from open

shops. Workers,

moreover,

the open shop according to
pick
their individual preferences. The existence of these
the closed

could

or

would
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bel'S of the unit
non-union

fairly and
minority 'from

More

concretely,
bargaining agent
union employees,

the

at

same

time to free the

any financial

responsibility.

require the union as
the grievances of non

it is unreal to
to

process

sometimes at considerable expense,
their interests in collective bargaining,

and to protect
while freeing them from
Such

result is not

a

that the

draw

right

obligation.
general argument
includes the right to with
the

to association

withhold financial support. The union as
agent is not like the ordinary association

to

or

any financial

justified by

bargaining

diversity of employment opportunities is not suffi
ciently wide-spread to make this qualification relevant
to current problems of labor policy.
The Taft-Hartley-union shop, unlike the two other
arrangements, conditions employment, not on con

depart at will. The anti
employee, so long as he remains
in
the
unit
is, to repeat, subject to the bar
employed
gaining agent's authority and is entitled to fair repre
sentation. In this context, the usual right to withdraw
from a voluntary association is scarcely relevant, let
alone controlling.
You may, of course, suggest that the theoretical duty

tinued union

of fair

alternatives and the

justify

competition

regulation of the
agreements. But this

abstention from the

state

of collective

terms

discipline

of

bargaining

membership, but only on financial sup
the
of
port
bargaining agent. This is a significant
difference because it operates to minimize limitations
both
and

the

on

the

freedom

employer's
employees' personal

to

select his

employees

from which
union

or

member

interests

can

is not in

representation

non-union

ality

a

non-union

employees
neglected.

Arbitrators

are

and

point

to

practice realized as to
grievances and

and that their

dispute

where unions have

cases

that gener
fought the

freedom. It also limits

battles of non-unionized members of the unit. There

the need for state interference in the union's internal

are
many motivations for such battles. The interests
of union employees may call for vigorous protection

on

affairs.
I shall not

spell out the competing arguments con
cerning
desirability or prohibiting even this limited
form of compulsion. You probably have heard them
all. I will merely describe the basis for my conclusion
that the Taft-Hartley union shop is a reasonable com
promise, which should not be superseded by the en-.
actment of so-called right to work laws. As I develop
the

my position, you will notice that abstract arguments
about the right to join or to stay out of associations

persuasive than judgments about the
distinctive character of the community which we call
the ba�'gaining unit and about the prerequisites for
seem

to

orderly

me

less

collective

bargaining.
already seen that under the majority rule
principle the bargaining representative has exclusive
bargaining authority, subject, however, to a duty to
represent all members of the unit fairly. It is that
principle which involves the fundamental limitation on
the freedom of the dissenting minority in the organ
ized plant-a limitation more drastic than that imposed
by the share-the-cost principle of the Taft-Hartley Act.
We have

This

fundamental

limitation

is

tolerable

because

rule is necessary for stable and orderly collec
tive bargaining, and collective bargaining has im

majority

portant values which. the community wishes
the
the

The

to

pre

continuing authority
responsibility of
with
to
all members of
bargaining agent
respect
unit, justifies, I believe, the requirement that all

serve.

of them should pay
unreal to require the

and

a

fair share of the

representative

cost.

It is

to treat all

mem-

of the non-union

ones.

the

The

bargaining agent may wish
employees in the

of non-union

good-will
they will become members or at least
abandon active hostility or any disposition to join a
rival. And the bargaining agent may be moved by the
ethical and legal obligation represented by the duty
to

earn

hope

that

of fair

representation.

In any event, the law

impose

the

duty

the obstacles

of fair

to its

continue to,

representation notwithstanding

full

A

union

does, and should

discharge

coherent

in favor of

labor

non

would

employees.
policy
scarcely be advanced by ignoring that duty when the
issue is that of fairly allocating the costs incurred by
the bargaining agent.
The
union

argument

I have made for the

Taft-Hartley

is not the conventional

shop
argument that the
non-union employees benefit from union activities and,
accordingly, should pay a fair share of the cost in
volved in getting union benefits. The benefit argu
ment is, of course,
open to question. Perhaps non
union employees have the initiative, the industry and
the skill which would bring them more rewards,
psychic and financial, than they get under collective
bargaining. Perhaps, in a given situation collective
bargaining produces no benefit for any employee. On
the other hand, perhaps non-union employees do bene
fit and are merely playing the paying members for
suckers. In any event, the paying members will feel
like suckers and the resultant bitterness
may add to
the difficulty of achieving the
of
statutory

objectives

protecting the employment of the non-union minority
and of insuring that they are fairly represented.

are

which complicate
union dues are used to finance
First,
my argument.
activities which are remote from collective bargaining
and which also may be opposed by employees forced

are

Let

me

turn to two considerations

finance them. I refer

to

primarily

to

political

activities

which unionism seeks to affect
action and to advance its idea of the
I recognize that the problem here is

and related activities

for the non-union member, who lacks
even the theoretical
possibility of shaping the union's
official position. But the problem is also important for
who belong to the union because of its

employees
bargaining

activities and in

spite

of its

political

ac

The problem involved thus affects all who
finance union activities, and it should, I believe, be
handled as a general problem, rather than by way of
tivities.

of the

Taft-Hartley union shop.
complication is union corruption, which
is now being urged as an independent reason for such
a
prohibition. Compulsory dues naturally aggravate
the corruption problem because they increase the loot
and reduce the ability of members or dues payers to
protest by withholding financial support. But, again,
corruption is a general problem affecting both the
majority and the dissenting minority. And, again, I
believe that is should be treated as a general problem
and should not be attacked by way of the Taft
Hartley union shop.
Before concluding, I should like to make two general

prohibition

The second

points, which may help to put the right-to-work con
troversy' in proper perspective. First, I doubt that
"right-to-work" laws are significant in relation to the

problems

raised

by

the concentration of power in
can
substantially influence

centralized unions which

policies on an industry-wide basis. Union secu
compulsory union arrangements are, as I in
rity
dicated earlier, more significant as a consequence,
wage

or

than

as

a

are a case

of such power. The railroad unions
point. Although the Railway Labor Act

cause,

in

until 1951 barred all such arrangements those unions
grew in numbers and did not lag behind in bargaining.
The

legal

exploiting

our

traditions of freedom

the union movement;
blindly ignoring the many
at

snipe

where the

protection of

the

or,

merely to
secondly, that they
of economic life

areas

dignity

of the individual

is stilI unfinished business and where

some

employers

their economic and moral power to

not

are

using
job.

get

with the

on

by

governmental
good society.
especially acute

a
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remedies for the power of the centralized
are
any wise remedies-will

Class

of

1938-

Continued

de

from

page 5

and International

Legislation Comparee, France;

Institute of Public Finance, Paris.
Bert Ganzer presently is Supervising

Investigator

for the United States Civil Service Commission.
was

for

Military

Government Court Officer in

He

Germany

two

years.
Others of us

occasionally have been active in gov
ernment work.
Quintin Johnstone was attorney for
the OPA; John R. Canright was Deputy Attorney
General for the Territory of Hawaii for six years;
Henry Hill was in the General Counsel's Office of
the Civil Aeronautics Board in Washington for five
years; Franz Joseph has been General Counsel and
Director of American Council of NATO; Governor
of the Atlantic Union Committee; and Chairman of

European Foundation. Willis Parkin
Special Agent for the FBI. John Lynch
has occasionally served as Special Judge; Frank Mahin
is Police Judge at Pewee Valley, Kentucky.
Our legal ability is evidenced by our success in
staying out of the army. Fifty percent of us success
fully evaded (or do I mean avoided?-we never did
get to Income Taxes in Prof. Crosley's course on Tax
ation) military service. Those of us who did serve,
did so with distinction. Dick Mullins, Bob Hay
thorne and John Canright achieved the rank of Lt.
Colonel; Mel Cohen and Walter Berdal were Majors;
Art Sachs, Sheldon Bernstein and Roger Baird were
Lieutenants in the Navy; Tom Megan was Captain
and Battery Commander in Hawaii, the Philippines
the American
son

has been

and Okinawa.

Irwin Askow also achieved the rank

Captain. The overall average was dragged down
somewhat by a couple of clods like Jim Stevens and

of

Rosenfield. who

got above the rank of

national unions-if there

Maury

have to be much

Private, but the overall picture was good.
We have been reasonably active in civic and pro
fessional affairs; Robert Macdonald was a member

Although

more

heroic than

the second

it should not be

point

right-to-work

may sound

suppressed. Exponents

laws.

ungracious,
of

"right-to

work" laws should consider whether their insistence
on

freedom of

occupational

choice and the

dignity

of

the individual may not be excessively specialized, To
take only one example, they may wish to consider the
of restrictive

employer hiring policies as
well as FEPC legislation to the symbol of individual
freedom which they invoke. Otherwise, they will be
open to one of two unpleasant charges: First, that they
relationship

of the Board of

never

Managers

of the

Chicago

Bar Asso

ciation for two years and Chairman of the Entertain
ment

Committee

of the

Chicago

Bar

Association;

Frank Mahin is Elder and Clerk of the Session of the
Pewee

Valley Presbyterian Church; Henry

Hill is

a

member of the Board of Education of School District
No. 34 in
a

Glenview, Illinois; Richard Mullins has been

member of the Board of Park Commissioners and
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and of insuring that they are fairly represented.
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handled as a general problem, rather than by way of
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protest by withholding financial support. But, again,
corruption is a general problem affecting both the
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believe that is should be treated as a general problem
and should not be attacked by way of the Taft
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policies on an industry-wide basis. Union secu
compulsory union arrangements are, as I in
rity
dicated earlier, more significant as a consequence,
wage

or
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a

are a case

of such power. The railroad unions
point. Although the Railway Labor Act

cause,
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until 1951 barred all such arrangements those unions
grew in numbers and did not lag behind in bargaining.
The
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the union movement;
blindly ignoring the many
at
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of economic life
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